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DOCKET NO. ^ZO^K-Cft 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 3 1998 
Julia D'AIesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
V. Case No. 980278-CA 
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
In its Memorandum Decision of July 9, 1998, the Court 
"upheld the trial court7s determination that the $5,500 
supersedeas bond was to be credited towards payment of 
appellee's attorney fees, collection costs, and costs on the 
first appeal (totaling $5,475.44), not towards the 
underlying judgment for $4,064.90 plus interest. The 
holding appears to be the same in the present appeal, i.e., 
the supersedeas bond of $6,700.00 is credited towards 
payment of appellee's attorney fees, collection costs, and 
costs on the second appeal, not towards the same underlying 
judgment for $4,064.90 plus interest. 
In the first appeal, payment was made without prior 
notice and hearing on the reasonableness and necessity of, 
and for, the attorneys fees, collection costs, and costs in 
the first appeal; no court order approved an award or 
payment of such fees and costs which the Court states 
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"total[ed] $5,475.44." 
In connection with the first appeal, looking to 
VonWald's EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL COURTS APPROVAL OF 
CASH SUPERSEDEAS BOND FOR $5000.00 [see Exhibit 1] which 
mentions only the June 8, 1994, judgment for $4064.90 to be 
superseded by the cash deposit of $5500.00, the trial 
court's approval of August 30, 1994, [". . .the cash 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $5500.00 deposited in this 
Court on August 11, 1994, is hereby in all things approved 
and allowed. . ."] (see Exhibit 2) has application only to 
the underlying judgment of June 8, 1994, for $4064.90. It 
is the same with the cash supersedeas bond of $6700.00 
deposited pursuant to ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY OF 
PROCEEDINGS, dated September 18, 1996 [true copy, Exhibit 3, 
appended hereto], which provides specifically that 
[paragraph 2.] "conditioned upon such deposit [of $6700.00], 
. . . and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 62 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, all proceedings to collect that 
certain Order and Judgment entered on or about June 8, 1994 
in the principal sum of $4,064.90. . .are stayed pending 
appeal." 
The supersedeas bond of $6,700.00 again was credited 
towards payment of appellee's attorney fees, collection 
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costs, and costs on the appeal, not towards the underlying 
judgment for $4,064.90 plus interest for which it was 
deposited. 
In past proceedings and appeals herein, the trial 
court, as well as this Court, has steadfastly refused to 
consider and rule upon the Constitutional, Fourteenth 
Amendment due process and equal protection issues presented 
where the proceeds of supersedeas bonds specifically and 
explicitly deposited to cover an underlying judgment are 
paid and applied elsewhere and otherwise than to the payment 
of the underlying judgment. 
This petition challenges, on Fourteenth Amendment due 
process and equal protection grounds, the holding of the 
Court that the proceeds of the supersedeas bonds deposited 
as aforesaid "[were] to be credited towards payment of 
appellee's attorney fees, [etc.], not towards the underlying 
judgment for $4,064.90 plus interest." 
Under Rule 62, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an 
appellant is granted the right, under sub-section (d), by 
giving a supersedeas bond, may obtain a stay, . . .effective 
when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court." Under 
sub-section (i)(2) "[u]pon motion and good cause shown, the 
court may permit a deposit of money in court or other 
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security to be given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond 
under Subdivision (d).11 Under sub-section (i)(4) "[a] 
surety's liability may be enforced on motion and upon such 
notice as the court may require without the necessity of an 
independent action." 
ISSUE: Did the Court's treatment of appellant's 
supersedeas bonds deny him a protected property interest as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment where the Court ruled 
that the proceeds of the cash supersedeas bond(s) were not 
to be applied towards the underlying judgment, but to 
attorney fees and costs, and payment out was made pursuant 
to such ruling notwithstanding that said bonds 
unambiguously provided that they covered the underlying 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT and AUTHORITY: "In general, the right to 
vindication through litigation, including the prosecution of 
an appeal, is a corollary of fundamental rights of 
citizenship." Scott v. Greenville County. 716 F.2d 1409 
(4th Cir. 1983) "The (U.S. Supreme) Court traditionally has 
held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants 
who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping 
to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to 
redress grievances." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.P 102 
4 
S.Ct. 1148 (1982) 
It should be conceded that State law afforded appellant 
VonWald a protectible property interest in the right to file 
supersedeas bonds, and in the supersedeas bonds themselves, 
sufficient to trigger federal due process guarantees which 
include his right to have the bonds applied to the 
underlying judgment in accordance with the unambiguous terms 
of the bonds and the right to not have the court 
unilaterally and arbitrarily, and without process, divert 
and pay the proceeds away from the underlying judgment. 
"The Due Process Clause contains a substantive component 
that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government action 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them." Daniels v. Williamsf 474 US at 331, 88 
L.Ed.2d 662, 106 S.Ct. 662. 
This as evidenced by the availability of the State law 
remedy of an appellant providing supersedeas which in itself 
is a recognition by the State of a protected interest. 
Memphis Lightf Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12, 
98 S.Ct. 1554, 1561-1562, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). Further 
indication of the State's recognition of the importance of 
an appellant's right to supersedeas is Utah's decisional 
law, e.g., U-M Investments v. Rayr 701 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
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1985), and the requirements of the rule itself, e.g., "Upon 
motion and good cause shown, the court may.. .", sub-section 
(i)(2); ". . .the surety's liability may be enforced on 
motion and upon such notice as the court may require without 
the necessity of an independent action." sub-section 
(i)(4); "The party so objecting shall be entitled to a 
hearing thereon upon five days notice or such shorter time 
as the court may order." Sub-section (i)(j). 
The hallmark of property [property interest] is an 
individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot 
be removed except for cause. [See discussion of cause in a 
way relating to the filing of a supersedeas bond under 
headnote [5] and [6], pp. 1416-1417, Scott v. Greenville 
Countyr 716 F.2d 1409.] Once that characteristic is found, 
the types of interests protected as "property" are varied 
and, as often as not, intangible, relating "to the whole 
domain of social and economic fact." (citations omitted) 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.. 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982). 
CONCLUSION: Under the facts and law presented, 
appellant's due process and equal protection rights 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment are violated. 
Wherefore appellant requests relief as prayed for in his 
motion to reverse filed herein. 
6 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED July 23, 1998. 
K&RRY R. VONWALD 
2535 Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
(801) 942 1720 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On July 23, 1998, two true copies mailed as follows: 
Dennis K. Poole 
4543 South 700 East, S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
7 
LARRY R. VONWALD, Plaintiff-Appellant 
2635 Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Telephone 801 942 1720 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
. . EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR 
Plaintiff-Appellant, TRIAL COURT'S APPROVAL OF CASH 
SUPERSEDES BOND FOR $5000,00 
V. 
Case # 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Sup. Ct. # 94 0346 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Whereas, on July 7, 1994, plaintiff-appellant perfected his 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the final order of the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki entered in this matter on June 8, 1994, 
said final order including money judgment therein in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff for the sum of $4,064.90; and 
Whereas, on August 11, 1994, plaintiff deposited with the 
clerk of said Court a cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $5000.00 
and obtained a receipt therefore which is attached hereto, said 
supersedeas bond deposited in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 62, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Whereas, defendant threatens execution sale of certain 
personal property on August 30, 1994 pursuant to execution issued 
out of the above Court on July 29, 1994 a copy of which is appended 
hereto with constable's notice of sale. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff herewith moves the Court for an order 
approving said supersedeas bond pursuant to Rule 62(d), Utah Rules 
• £A I 
of Civil Procedure. 
DATED August 26, 1994 
LARRY R. VONWALD, Plaintiff-Appellant 
2635 Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Telephone 801 942 1720 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
STATE OF UTAH 
*•» "» ' ' C | 
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TRIAL COURT'S APPROVAL OF CASH 
SUPERSEDES BOND.FOR $5000.Oft 
Case # 930905795 
Sup. Ct. # 94 0346 
Upon application of the plaintiff, good cause appearing for 
the approval of cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $*$$€'. 00 filed 
in the above cause, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the cash supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$5000-. 00 deposited in this Court on August 11, 1994, is hereby in 
all things approved and allowed such approval being in accordance 
with and to have the effect mentioned in Rule 62(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. -E» /%. 
DATED August J&, 1994. 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
or»'----..;^-,:-,q;i • .... 
B4THE.'-' H) -.WO?-' 
• AKecouKuf.*"*-^ 
rri 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES/ P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVTIN PLUMB, i 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
THE PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his attorney 
Larry L. Whyte having orally requested the Court to set the amount 
of a cash supersedeas bond by telephonic hearing on the 19th day of 
September, 1996, and the Defendant Kevin Plumb being represented by 
his attorney Dennis K. Poole who participated in such telephonic 
hearing, and the Court having heard the representations of counsel, 
and for good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows; 
1. That Plaintiff may deposit a cash bond with the Clerk of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the 
amount of $6,700. 
2. Conditioned upon such deposit and the presentation of 
evidence of the same to Defendant's counsel, and pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all 
proceedings to collect that certain Order and Judgment entered on 
or about June 8, 1994 in the principal sum of $4,064.90 (together 
with interest and other relief as provided therein) entered in 
favor or the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, including the 
enforcement of executions, a sheriff's sale scheduled for this date 
and continued until September 23, 1996, and any other collection 
proceedings, are stayed pgjrflinq appeal. 
ORDER dated this /£/*T!fav of September, 
BY JHHTJZOURT 
)G£ GLENN K. IWASAKI 




Attorney for the Plaintiff 
